Somali Piracy - Part 2: Al-Shabaab as the Solution

Piracy was born as a reaction to the illegal dumping of toxic waste along the Somali coast and to the exploitation of Somali waters by western fishermen. The number of piracy attacks is believed to have escalated due to the actions of the most radically Islamist component of the Islamic Courts, Al-Shabaab. This group, whose name means ‘the youth’, has always been at the forefront of the Islamic Courts’ activity, particularly in a military sense. During the six months of the Islamic Courts’ government in 2006, piracy was greatly diminished, and more recently Al-Shabaab has attacked headquarters of pirate groups, such as those in Bandarbeyla. Despite this however, its attacks are more frequently focusing on the various non-governmental organisations and humanitarian aid agencies, thereby forcing them to leave the country. Yet the effect of reduced inflows of aid, which were needed by locals as well as warlords, who depended on them to finance their militias, has been an intensification of pirate activity.

Three factors are believed to have led to the radicalisation of Al-Shabaab. These are, firstly, the US Department of State’s decision to include it in its blacklist of terrorist organisations, and secondly, the death of Sheikh Adan Hashi Ayro, one of the group’s leaders, during a US bombardment on 1st May 2008. More importantly however, is the international community’s decision, through the UN Development Programme, to support the federal transitional government. Al-Shabaab interpreted this act as prejudiced against its armed guerrillas in favour of an illegitimate transitional government. Therefore, failure of the international community to recognise and support more than one political group made Al-Shabaab averse to all international actors, as doing so effectively relegated its status to that of a mere faction of a much wider political movement.

It is well known that the effects of Somalia’s internal turmoil are felt throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have assumed important roles and declared their intentions to provide military and political assistance to the alliance of countries present in the Gulf of Aden. However, the commitments of other countries, such as Yemen, appear more elusive as their preferred contact remains with leaders of the Islamic Courts and Al-Shabaab, particularly for their ability to effectively eradicate piracy. Yet this contact is restricted and not officially pursued due to the presence of Al-Shabaab on the US’ blacklist. The solution is therefore to allow Somalia’s neighbours to handle the crisis in the way that they believe will be successful; by using their local appreciation of the political balance within Somalia. Al-Shabaab can no longer be vilified as it presents the Gulf region with its greatest opportunity for re-establishing stability. To eliminate piracy therefore, the West must accept, support and actively seek help from Al-Shabaab.

Somali Piracy - Part 1: Issues of International Law

Many strategic experts believe that the international anti-piracy fleet operating in the Gulf of Aden would have to number more than 500 ships in order to effectively police the 600,000 square mile Gulf region, a number which others believe would still be insufficient to counter the attacks from smaller fishing boats. Faced with this enormous space, the only viable option is to seek large scale international cooperation and establish coordinated, multinational fleets which form part of broader alliances than those currently operating in the region, thereby engaging the wider community of nations in the task of upholding international maritime law and the peremptory norms of jus cogens. However, international laws of the sea and national civil laws render any proposed military intervention a complex legal issue. In addition to this, the European and NATO coalitions are subject to further stringent rules of engagement, as well as detailed UN Security Council resolutions which establish precisely what sort of action may be taken. Nevertheless, every state is legally eligible to intervene against piracy due to the international nature of the crime and the absence of a state which will grant them protection.

The use of force may be used to interrupt an act of piracy as it is taking place, however international law does not consent to pirate vessels being shot and sunk. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea only allows for the boarding and confiscation of pirate vessels and for the arrest of crew members. When such action is opposed by pirates, a proportionate use of force may be used whereby the sinking of the vessel is considered an action of last resort, and the use of a disabling fire to stop the motors is preferred. Moreover, a UN Security Council resolution is needed to legitimately attack the pirates’ bases on land unless a single country decides to act unilaterally to defend its national interests, usually by securing the release of hostages. Normally the latter must occur in international waters, as entry into the territorial waters of a sovereign state is prohibited under international law. However, an exception was made following UN Resolution 1851 and the subsequent agreement reached with the Somali transitional government.

One possible solution to the piracy problem would be for the UN to authorise the various naval forces policing the region to block all non-escorted vessels from gaining access to or departing from the Somali coast. However this is impracticable due to the length of the coastline in question. Furthermore, there is no international consensus over how pirates should be tried once they have been captured and detained. The laws of France and Italy, for example, grant jurisdiction for the prosecution of foreign pirates that are captured in international waters. Denmark, on the other hand, whose ship, the Absalon, captured ten men suspected of piracy and detained them for six days, was forced to liberate them on the coast of Puntland on 23rd September 2008 due to the legal impossibility of prosecuting them under Danish law. In contrast, the UK was able to hand over pirates to the Kenyan authorities after detaining them for several days following the conflict involving HMS Cumberland. It is evident therefore, that international bodies such as the UN and EU must aim for legislative harmonisation in this field and place pirates under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Despite this, it is necessary to remember that piracy is merely the most prominent illegal activity currently taking place in Somalia. A host of crimes, which includes human trafficking, arms and drug smuggling and chemical waste dumping is impossible to resolve without restoring law and order to a failed state.

Chinese Investment in Africa

China has decided to increase its China-Africa Development Fund by $2 billion. This state-controlled equity fund has so far invested in 20 projects across Africa since it was established in June 2007. The current global recession, which has caused many Western investors to withdraw their investments from Africa, will provide further encouragement for Chinese businesses to operate on the continent. The official purpose of the fund, according to a speech made by Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2006, was to deepen Chinese aid to Africa through an extensive package of assistance, trade, investment and construction projects. However, it has become increasingly evident that the true reasons behind this extensive investment commitment are, firstly, to secure China’s access to the natural resources it requires to keep its economic expansion progressing, and secondly, to gain support from African states at the United Nations.

The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation intended to boost output from 40.3 million tonnes in 2006 to 78 million tonnes in 2007. In order to achieve such a growth rate China has had to continually assist its oil companies to invest in regions where Western firms are extremely reluctant to do so, due to their uncertain political and legal environments and precarious stability. As such, China will fund infrastructure projects in countries subject to Western sanctions, such as Sudan, or where security issues deter Western firms from increasing levels of investment, such as Nigeria. An example of such a strategy can be seen in China’s willingness to enter Somalia's oil industry. Evidently therefore, China would rather secure control of natural resources at their source rather than purchase them on the global markets. This readiness to deal with regions that are considered out of bounds by Western competitors may be explained by the lack of political influence and technical expertise of Chinese oil firms.

Whilst initial Chinese activity in Africa was well received, particularly due to the absence of any colonial history between China and the recipients of its investments, China’s practices have caused growing concern across the continent, as its actions are often seen as supporting and prolonging the lives of corrupt or dictatorial regimes. Beijing has attempted to dispel this perception by investing in infrastructure projects in areas where resentment is strongest and by granting local businesses greater access to China's markets in selected industries. Beijing has provided the Angolan government with a total of $2 billion in loans in exchange for continuous oil supplies. This investment has undoubtedly allowed Angola to avoid implementing reforms demanded by Western governments and investors, yet the country has seen its prosperity greatly increase from its large-scale oil production. Angola’s ruling party has also signed an agreement with China which contains a proviso that 70% of all construction projects will be awarded to Chinese companies. Moreover, Angola has since become China’s primary source of oil. Whilst some of this money has been able to fund improvements in infrastructure and healthcare, the endemic corruption has prevented the optimal amount of funds from reaching these projects. Furthermore, China has been criticised for its relationship with Sudan, whose government has been condemned by the international community for the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Sudan has gradually become the number one recipient of Chinese investments due to its vast oil reserves. However, it cannot be denied that Sudanese workers are acquiring new skills through the availability of Chinese funded work, and that throughout the continent the Chinese are building factories which will allow many other countries to benefit in much the same way.

Zhang Junsai, Chinese ambassador to Australia, has said that Chinese companies investing in Australia and elsewhere are merely seeking long-term, sound and reliable supplies of energy, rather than absolute control of a foreign country’s natural resources. The Chinese government is unlikely to demand compliance with internationally recognised human rights standards, as it often disregards these norms internally. Perhaps with increased prosperity, work opportunities and improved infrastructure, African countries can be stabilised and encouraged to effectuate the necessary institutional reforms by their own people, without the ineffective and often-ignored calls of the international community.