Afghan President Hamid Karzai, US President Barack Obama and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, 6 May 09
The Obama administration's policy towards Pakistan, as outlined in this white paper, focuses on the need to improve cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the ability of Pakistan to fight extremists and how to strengthen the Pakistani government through increased American support. Whilst the administration's objectives for Afghanistan appear more detailed, achieving its goals for Pakistan will be far more arduous. Before the 2008 US presidential elections, Obama's staff asserted that it would be necessary to stabilise Pakistan before its neighbour could be stabilised. This however, would have required the assistance of India in diplomatically reassuring Pakistan, which remains concerned at New Delhi's encroachment into what it regards as its sphere of influence, namely over countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and the central Asian republics. As can be expected, Pakistani security concerns are linked to its poor relationship with India and its neighbour's potential to disaggregate the state, as it did following the conflict fought in 1971 as a result of the genocide in East Pakistan that ultimately led to the territory declaring independence.
President Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as special envoy to the region which was to include India. However, following the pressure from influential Indian lobby groups, his mandate covered only Afghanistan and Pakistan. India was keen to avoid any presumption that its policy towards Kashmir and Pakistan could have anything to do with Islamabad's behaviour in the region. Nevertheless, the Indian government assured the US that it would not tolerate the involvement of Pakistan in the security issues of Afghanistan. Therefore, as India's status as a regional power continually grows, Pakistan has felt compelled to address the balance of power through the only instrument at its disposal; the military. The US has so far been incapable of dissuading Pakistan from considering its military as a tool for foreign policy. Pakistan has been reluctant to adopt adequately restrictive measures against its military option and cannot fight effectively against militants that have decidedly sided against the state. Pakistan is now also convinced that its nuclear arsenal would allow it to engage in unconventional warfare.
The US' options for Pakistan are limited. Congress has sought to introduce various legislative modifications to enhance American assistance to Islamabad in the area of security or attempt to increase funds to strengthen the debilitated civil and political institutions of the country. Current laws are deemed restrictive as they bind American security assistance to the Pakistani president's guarantee that Pakistan does not support terrorism and that it does not harbour anyone that has dealt with the nuclear black market. The Obama administration fears that these conditions could push Pakistan to seek new allies and thereby deny Washington the strategic opportunity to monitor and determine Pakistan's behaviour and political choices. The US is still in great need of Pakistan's logistical support in Afghanistan, because, even though they admit that the Northern Route into the country can no longer be used and that Iran's border provides the best entry routes into Afghanistan, any formal involvement of Iran in the conflict remains impossible.
In summary, Washington and the international community do not know what course of action to take with Pakistan. Until a real solution is found, Pakistan will continue to represent one of the greatest threats to the region and the wider international community.
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